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We examine the impact of incomplete risk-sharing on growth and
welfare. The source of market incompleteness in our economy is pri-
vate information: a household’s idiosyncratic productivity shock is
not observable by others. Risk-sharing between households occurs
through long-term contracts with intermediaries. We …nd that incom-
plete risk-sharing tends to reduce the rate of growth relative to the
complete risk-sharing benchmark. Numerical examples indicate the
contracts are relatively e¢cient and that the growth e¤ects of private
information are small.
21. Introduction
Recent research has found evidence that is inconsistent with the full insurance
predictions of the complete markets model. For example, Cochrane (1991), Mace
(1991) and Hayashi et al. (1996) provide evidence against complete risk-sharing
within the US at the individual level; Townsend (1994) and Maitra (1997) re-
ject full insurance across households within Indian villages; and Backus et al.
(1992), Baxter and Crucini (1994) and Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (1997)
provide evidence against cross-country consumption risk-sharing. Motivated by
this …nding, we consider the e¤ect of risk on growth and welfare. We develop an
environment where household production is subject to idiosyncratic shocks which
are private information, and growth is endogenous. The assumption of private
information provides a basis for market incompleteness; the resulting problem of
incentive compatibility eliminates the possibility of complete risk-sharing. House-
holds share risk through long-term contracts with competitive intermediaries.1
The enduring relationship allows intermediaries to exploit intertemporal trade-
o¤s, thereby providing (partial) insurance.
Previous work on risk and growth typically has contrasted complete risk-
sharing with autarchy. Since the extent of market incompleteness is endogenous
in our environment, we are able to examine an intermediate case. We …nd that the
presence of uninsurable risk reduces the rate of growth relative to the complete
risk-sharing benchmark. This, for example, di¤ers from the result in Devereux
and Smith (1994). Comparing autarchy with complete risk-sharing, in a model
of capital risk which essentially shares our technology and preferences, they …nd
1Thus, the extent of market incompleteness is endogenous in our economy.
3that the e¤ect of risk on savings, and hence growth, is ambiguous.2 Our results
indicate that the impact of risk on growth and welfare is likely to be sensitive
to the origin of market incompleteness and the types of insurance arrangements
allowed.
In related work, Marcet and Marimon (1992) examine a two-agent model with
capital accumulation where a risk-neutral investorwith unlimited resourcesinvests
in the technology of a risk-averse producer whose output is subject to productivity
shocks which are private information.3 Our work extends their analysis to a
market-clearing economy with endogenous growth. In contrast to Marcet and
Marimon, we …nd that investment, as well as consumption, is a¤ected by shocks to
production. As a result, there are growth e¤ects of private information. However,
numerical examples indicate that, on average, the growth and welfare e¤ects of
incomplete risk-sharing are likely to be small.
In section 2 we describe technology, preferences and the contract. Section 3
solves the contract assuming logarithmic utility, while section B of the appendix
examines the contract when utility is iso-elastic. Numerical examples are pre-
sented in section 4; these provide quantitative measures of the size of the growth
and welfare e¤ects resulting from private information. Section 5 discusses ad-
ditional applications of our model. In particular, there are several interesting
di¤erences between our long term contracting economy with production and the
2The ambiguous e¤ect of risk on savings was noted by Levhari and Srinivasan (1969). Specif-
ically, when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is low (high), risk tends to raise (reduce)
savings. See Weil (1990). Obstfeld (1994) shows that when risk sharing leads to a portfolio shift
into riskier, more productive assets, it may be growth promoting.
3See also Aiyagari and Williamson (1997) for a model of credit in which only the social
planner has access to capital.
4more standard model of contracts with risky endowments. These may be of inde-
pendent interest.
2. The Environment
In each period, there is a large number of households each of which operates a
technology of the form Yt = ztKt where Yt is output, Kt is capital, and zt is the
level of productivity at time t = 0;1;:::. Productivity, which is independently
and identically distributed across households at any time, and over time for any
household, takes on one of two possible values: it is zi with probability ¹i > 0,
i = 1;2, where 0 < z1 < z2 and ¹1 + ¹2 = 1. We de…ne the expected value
of productivity as » =
P2
i=1¹izi and assume that capital completely depreciates
after production.
Households are in…nitely lived, and possess time separable preferences over
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1¡¾ for ¾ > 0 and ¾ 6= 1,
(1 ¡ ¯)logC for ¾ = 1.
Note that, for convenience, we normalize the utility function by (1 ¡ ¯) 2 (0;1)
where future utility is discounted by ¯.
Each household participates in a permanent contract with a risk-neutral, com-
petitive intermediary. In any period, only the household observes its own produc-
tivity, thus there is private information with respect to output. At the beginning
of the period the household has a predetermined capital stock, K. Given the
5household’s capital, the intermediary announces a set of potential transfers, Bi,
and investments, K
0
i, as functions of the impending productivity report. Upon
observing its output, ziK, the household determines a report for the intermedi-
ary. Subsequently, the intermediary executes the transfer, and implements the
investment for the household, which determines its capital stock at the onset of
the next period. By de…nition, if the contract is incentive-compatible, then, at
every point in time, the household will truthfully report the level of productivity.
Hence consumption in state i will be Ci = ziK + Bi.
Our approach in solving the contract adapts the methods used to characterize
the risky endowment model of long-term contracts.4 An important assumption
in extending these existing results to our analysis is that the household has no
ability to invest in an unobservable manner. The value of misreporting productiv-
ity lies in being able to consume hidden output. In order to ensure truth-telling
(incentive-compatibility), we constrain the contract so there are no gains from
one-period temporary deviations from truth-telling. That is, the contract is tem-
porarily incentive compatible (t.i.c.) in the sense of Green (1987). Provided
certain boundary conditions, satis…ed by our problem, hold, temporary incentive
compatibility is equivalent to incentive compatibility. Next, since the t.i.c. con-
straints introduce future expected lifetime utility as a state variable, we follow
Green in characterizing the contract by solving a dual, expenditure minimization
problem for the intermediary. Standard duality theorems ensure that this solu-
tion also solves the utility maximization problem faced by household.5 Finally,
4See for example Green (1987), Taub (1990), Phelan and Townsend (1991), Atkeson and
Lucas (1992) and the related analysis of Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Thomas and Worrall
(1990).
5A formal proof of these results, which are standard but require considerable additional
6we impose an aggregate resource constraint upon our economy: the sum of con-
sumption and investment cannot exceed output. This is related to the approach
taken by Atkeson and Lucas (1992) in the context of an endowment economy.
Let U
0
i represent expected lifetime utility, starting next period, for the house-
hold, assuming that it will accurately report productivity from that date onward,
given a current productivity report of zi. When the state is z1, temporary incen-
tive compatibility is ensured by the following constraint.
if z1K + B2 > 0 then v(z1K + B1) + ¯U
0
1 ¸ v(z1K + B2) + ¯U
0
2 (2.1)
The left hand side of (2.1) represents the value to the household with actual
output z1K of truthfully reporting its productivity. Provided that misreporting
the level of productivity generates a feasible level of consumption, then the right
hand side of the constraint represents the value of following this strategy. The
t.i.c. constraint when productivity is z2 is given below.
v(z2K + B2) + ¯U
0
2 ¸ v(z2K + B1) + ¯U
0
1 (2.2)
Note that, as z2 > z1, non-negativity of C1 ensures that z2K+B1 ¸ 0, eliminating
the need for a conditional constraint. As discussed in Oh and Green (1992),





2. Furthermore, if (2.2) binds and B1 ¸ B2 (B1 > B2) then (2.1) is
satis…ed (holds with inequality). These results will prove useful below.
As indicated earlier, we obtain equilibriumallocations forthe contracting econ-
omy using a dual approach. Given an initial utility entitlement, U, and capital
notation, may be found in Khan and Ravikumar (1996).
7stock, K, for the household, the intermediary solves an expenditure minimization
problem. Hereafter, we will refer to the solution of the expenditure minimization
problem as the contract. In this formulation, we must impose a promise-keeping
constraint upon the contract which ensures that the household’s expected lifetime











The intermediary can borrow from, or lend to, other intermediaries at the constant
discount factor, q 2 (0;1). Let the expected present value of expenditure be









i=1 subject to the incentive compatibility constraints (2.1)
















The expected present value of expenditure, at the optimum, will equal the sum of
expected current expenditure and the discounted expected present value of expen-
ditures incurred from the next period onwards. A competitive intermediary must
maximize the household’s expected lifetime utility; in equilibrium, this implies a
zero pro…t condition E (U;K) = 0 which determines U given K.
3. Analysis
In this section we provide a complete characterization of the private information
economy for the case of logarithmic preferences. The case of general iso-elastic
8utility is similar, and is summarized in section B of the appendix.
3.1. The Contract
In order to solve the Bellman equation, we de‡ate the value function by capi-
tal. This allows us to reformulate the contract into an intensive form which, by
exploiting a homogeneity property of the problem, reduces the dimension of the
state vector. Let biK = Bi and °iK = K
0















Now de…ne a composite state variable, u ´ U ¡logK. Consistency requires that











i + log°i + logk, the t.i.c. constraint at z1 may be revised as
if z1 + b2 ¸ 0 then (3.2)













while the t.i.c. constraint at z2 is equivalent to



























9Since the constraints above depend only upon the composite state variable, we are
able to de…ne W(u) = E(U;K)=K. The intensive form problem, which describes















We now analyze the intensive form contract. Let ¸ and µ be the multipliers for
the constraints (3.3) and (3.4). We suppress (3.2) which never binds, as is shown


























































2) ¡ ¸¯ ¡µ¹2¯ = 0 (3.11)
The Benveniste-Scheinkman theorem implies W
0(u) = µ.
The e¢ciency conditions allow a strong characterization of the risk-sharing
contract. Firstly, the introduction of productive capital o¤ers a channel for adjust-
6See Khan and Ravikumar (1996) where we establish, for a more general problem, that W is
strictly increasing, convex and di¤erentiable and that the equilibrium described here is unique.
10ing utility entitlements absent in the endowment model. As a result, the continu-
ation value of the state variable, u
0
i, is independent of productivity and the initial
state, u. The linear production structure implies that utility entitlements, U, are
linear functions of the logarithm of the capital stock, K. Changes in expected
lifetime utility which occur in response to productivity reports are implemented
through changes in the household’s stock of capital. Secondly, risk-aversion on
part of the household implies that the contract insures current consumption: when
the household reports low productivity the net transfer is higher than when it re-
ports high productivity (b1 > b2). Alternatively, repayment is lower. However,
the presence of private information limits the extent of risk-sharing. Households
must be prevented from under-reporting income during periods when income is
relatively high. As a result, reports of low productivity reduce lifetime consump-
tion. Given diminishing marginal utility, the cost minimizing intermediary will
spread this fall in lifetime consumption over time. Consequently, our third result
is that low productivity results in both lower current consumption and reduced
investment (c1 < c2 and °1 < °2). These qualitative characteristics of the contract
are summarized in the following proposition. (All proofs are in appendix A.)




2, °1 < °2, b1 > b2 and c1 < c2.
The higher transfer when z = z1, given the binding incentive constraint at z2,
implies that the t.i.c. constraint at z1 does not bind, as assumed above.
3.2. Equilibrium
As noted earlier, since E is strictly increasing in U given K, the zero pro…t
condition E (U;K) = 0 will determine the highest level of expected lifetime utility
11feasible for the household given its initial stock of capital. Since E (U;K) =
KW (U ¡logK), this zero pro…t condition implies, given strict monotonicity of







is the same for all households. As a result, any household with capital stock K and
productivity zi will be allocated current consumption (zi + bi)K and investment
°iK. Average output for all households with K units of capital will be »K,
assuming a positive measure of such households; average consumption for this
group will be
P2
i=1¹i (zi + bi)K and average investment will be
P2
i=1¹i°iK.
Economy-wide market clearing requiresthat aggregate output equal the sum of
aggregate consumption and investment. This equilibrium restriction on aggregate
allocations implies an equivalent restriction on the expected or average current
expenditure within the contract which determines q. Let Ã (K) represent the
distribution of capital across households over the space of current capital holdings,








¹i (zi + bi + °i)
!
KÃ(K).
This market-clearing condition requires that
P2
i=1¹i (bi + °i) = 0. Next, using













2, this implies u
0
i = u, i = 1;2, since W (u) = 0. Finally, (3.8) and (3.10)
yield the equilibrium condition qµ = 1. Note that the recursive equilibrium is
stationary in the sense that (bi;°i)
2
i=1, q and u are time-invariant. This veri…es
our earlier conjecture that q is constant.
We now contrast growth between our incomplete risk-sharing economy and
the complete risk-sharing benchmark. The latter, a well-known problem, may be
retrieved by suppressing (3.3) (setting ¸ = 0 everywhere) and repeating the above
12analysis. Thesolution, denoted by superscript f, ischaracterized by c
f
i = (1 ¡ ¯)»
and °
f
i = ¯» for i = 1;2. Furthermore, under complete risk-sharing qf» = 1 and






The introduction of private information reduces the mean rate of growth,
P2
i=1¹i°i, relative to the complete risk-sharing value of ¯». As a result, the inter-
mediary’s discount rate, q¡1 ¡ 1 falls. We suggest the following explanation. If,
upon observing z2, the household truthfully reports the productivity then it con-
sumes C2, while misrepresentation yields consumption equal to (z2 ¡ z1)K + C1.
All else being equal, higher levels of capital tend to increase the current gains
to deviations from truth-telling. The contract then requires larger variations in
both Ci and U
0
i in order to ensure incentive-compatibility. Given convexity of
preferences, this tends to reduce welfare for any given level of resources. This
welfare reducing aspect of additional capital makes investment less attractive in
the private information economy relative to the complete risk-sharing economy.
Hence the overall rate of capital accumulation is lower under private information.














i=1¹ilog°i. Proposition (3.2) and Jensen’s Inequality jointly imply that the
expected increase in welfare is lower under private information. However, this
does not imply that welfare has a negative trend leading to the immiserization of
almost all households. This result, due to the possibility of economic growth, is
in sharp contrast to the endowment model.
134. Numerical examples
We examine several numerical examples. These allow us to describe the risk shar-
ing arrangement in more detail and obtain preliminary evidence on the magnitude
of the growth and welfare e¤ects of the incomplete risk-sharing environment. The
baseline parameter values we use are in table 1. The average level of productivity
is set equal to the long run return on equity in the U.S., » = 1:065, as indicated in
Mehra and Prescott (1985). We allow productivity to vary symmetrically around
its mean. Thus we assume that ¹1 = 0:5 and x = » ¡ z1 = z2 ¡ ». The para-
meter x is di¢cult to calibrate. In our baseline case we set its value to imply
that the coe¢cient of variation of z is 0:1. This value implies a standard deviation
of consumption growth of 0:0468, which is close to 0:044 predicted by the base
case of Heaton and Lucas (1996, table 4, p.458).7 Finally we choose ¯ so that
¯» = 1:02. The aggregate rate of growth for the complete risk-sharing economy,
when household preferences are logarithmic, matches the long run growth data,
as documented in Parente and Prescott (1993). This is also the average rate of
growth under autarchy, and, as we shall see, not signi…cantly di¤erent from the
rate of growth under incomplete risk-sharing.
We …rst examine the case of logarithmic preferences. Across the three di¤erent
allocations, autarchy (A), incomplete risk-sharing (I) and complete risk-sharing
(C), u +logK represents the level of expected lifetime utility for a household with
capital K. Thus u is the expected lifetime utility for a household with one unit of
capital. Each entry in the rows of tables 2 through 5 marked loss represents the
percentage decrease necessary in the level of consumption under complete risk-
7Below, we will examine examples involving di¤erent values of x.
14sharing, at every point in time, to match the level of welfare associated with the
other economies. We de‡ate all quantity variables by the level of capital. Thus,
given a shock zi, the household’s savings is ¡bi and ci is consumption, per unit
capital. Investment per unit capital is denoted °i, which is also the gross rate
of growth of capital. The average rate of growth is denoted E(°), while r is the
percentage discount rate (q =
1
1+r). Finally, ¢U represents the expected increase
in lifetime utility.
In table 2 wesee that, in the complete risk-sharing allocation, consumption and
investment are unresponsive to the productivity shock. The household’s savings
varies with productivity so as to completely smooth the consumption pro…le. The
incomplete risk-sharing economy induces ‡uctuations in current consumption, but
this variability in consumption is low relative to that under autarchy. There is
a net transfer of resources from households with high current productivity to
those with low current productivity: c1 + °1 > z1 while c2 + °2 < z2. For those
experiencing below average productivity, this reduces savings, while boosting both
consumption and investment, relative to autarchy. The residual variability in
consumption, and the reduced average growth rate, causes expected welfare to
increase more slowly than under complete risk-sharing, ¢U = 0:0184 < 0:0198.
The inability to smooth consumption under autarchy implies high variability in
both consumption and investment rates. Consequently, welfare increases yet more
slowly, ¢U = 0:0148.
In …gure 1, we illustrate initial lifetime expected utility for the complete risk-
sharing, incomplete risk-sharing and autarchy economies. As indicated by the loss
measures in table 2, the move from complete to incomplete insurance is equivalent
to a 1:6% decrease in the level of consumption, while autarchy implies an 11:2%
15decrease. In this example, we see that incentive compatible arrangements are
relatively successful in smoothing consumption. The switch fromsuch an economy
to autarchy results in a signi…cant loss in expected utility, measured in units of
full insurance consumption, for the typical household.
In …gures 2 and 3 we graph the evolution of the distribution of capital (K),
de‡ated by the compounded growth factor, and expected lifetime utility (U) for
the incomplete risk-sharing economy. All households are initially identical. Recall
that the intermediary enforces truth-telling by o¤ering relatively higher lifetime
utility entitlements for high productivity reports than for low productivity re-
ports at each point in time. As a result, both distributions of wealth and utility,
are characterized by increasing dispersion over time. For this example, the dis-
tribution of utility entitlements within each period is symmetric. Convexity of
preferences then implies a skewed distribution of capital. In proposition 3.1 we
showed that, in the private information economy, changes in welfare are imple-
mented through changes in capital. This log-linear mapping is also, of course,
present in the autarchic model. The greater variability in investment present in
autarchy implies that the private information economy dampens dispersion over
time relative to autarchy.
Next, in table 3, maintaining our other baseline parameters, we allow the co-
e¢cient of relative risk aversion, ¾, to vary between 1=2 and 4. We …nd that the
rate of growth under private information is consistently below the complete risk-
sharing equivalent. This result, which we have found to be robust, indicates that
the growth reducing e¤ect of incomplete risk-sharing, found for logarithmic prefer-
ences, extends to the case of iso-elastic utility. Interestingly, both the growth and
welfare e¤ects of private information fall as ¾ rises. Recall that higher values of ¾
16are associated with increased reluctance to substitute consumption across time.
As shown in proposition 3.1, potential deviations from truth-telling raise current
consumption at the expense of future consumption. As ¾ increases, the attractive-
ness of such behaviour is reduced. This reduces the costs of private information
and shifts the incomplete risk-sharing allocation closer to full insurance. For all
¾, the contract is relatively e¢cient. Even when the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is high (¾ = 0:5), the loss is only 2:57%. Note that, for the same ¾,
the loss under autarchy is more than three times as large, 9:77%. For higher val-
ues of ¾, autarchy yields larger welfare losses relative to incomplete risk-sharing.
Furthermore, under autarchy, income uncertainty generates a strong motive to
self-insure through savings when risk aversion is large. This drives the high rates
of growth relative to complete risk-sharing. As is well known, the sign of the risk
e¤ect on savings changes when ¾ crosses one. In contrast, the growth rate under
incomplete risk-sharing is always below that under complete risk-sharing, and the
growth e¤ects are small.
In table 4, we vary the coe¢cient of variation of z. This implies changes in z1
and z2. All other parameters are maintained at the values listed in table 1. Higher
variability of productivity implies higher risk and tends to reduce the e¢ciency of
the contract in terms of both growth and welfare. However, the di¤erences in rates
of growth never rise above one-tenth of one per cent and the associated welfare
e¤ect is small relative to autarchy. Table 5 considers changes in the discount
factor, ¯, while maintaining all other parameters at the table 1 values. The three
discount factors we consider, ¯ = 0:9390, 0:9577 and 0:9765 imply 0, 2 and 4 per
cent average growth, respectively. Note that higher values of ¯ imply an increased
emphasis on future consumption. As indicated by the negative trend in loss, this
17increases the e¢ciency of the contract for the same reason as in table 3.
These numerical examples indicate that, across a range of parameter values,
(1) the growth e¤ects of incomplete risk-sharing are small and (2) the incomplete
markets economy achieves levels of welfare close to the levels attained under com-
plete risk-sharing. The relative e¢ciency of the private information economy arises
from the ability to adjust capital, and hence output, in response to the changes
necessary in lifetime utility entitlement over time. This implies that changes in
a household’s utility entitlement are matched by proportionate movements in the
gain from understating productivity, (z2 ¡z1)K.
5. Concluding remarks
We have examined the impact of incomplete risk-sharing, in an environment with
private information, on growth and welfare. In our economy, households share risk
by entering into enduring relationships with competitive intermediaries. We have
found that the aggregate growth rate is lower under private information than un-
der full insurance. Furthermore, the risk-sharing arrangement, while incomplete,
is relatively e¢cient and the growth e¤ects of private information are generally
small.
Our work adapts the methods used to study long term contracting with risky,
unobservable endowments to an economy with production and capital accumula-
tion. The contract with capital exhibits several properties which contrast with
the standard model. First, expected lifetime utility, while growing more slowly
than under complete risk-sharing, does not necessarily contain a negative trend.
Second, the contract exhibits the property that all changes in welfare are imple-
18mented through changes in the household’s stock of capital. Consequently, welfare
always exceeds the autarchy value of capital. Finally, while both the endowment
and production economies share the property that the distribution of wealth or
utility entitlements is characterized by increasing dispersion, in the production
economy this rising inequality is larger under autarchy.8
The contract implements risk-sharing by conditioning the household’s future
lifetime utility, or wealth, on the current report of productivity. Thus we empha-
size the problem of unobservable returns to investment, the common emphasis
of the literature on private information in development economics. If investment
were itself unobservable, then our risk-sharing arrangement would be infeasible.9
In particular, the intermediary cannot exploit di¤erences in the rates of intertem-
poral substitution across households. It is, however, unclear what types of risk-
sharing arrangementsare then feasible. We viewthisasan area forfuture research.
An implication of our …ndings is that if resources may be devoted towards either
(1) reducing the e¤ects of informational asymmetries and thereby implementing
improved insurance services (allowing for observable returns to investment) or
(2) developing the legal basis for implementing state-contingent enforceable con-
tracts (allowing for observable investment), such as those we have assumed, then
expenditures on the latter may be far more important for welfare gains.
Our framework may also contribute to explanations of several empirical phe-
nomena that are apparently at odds with the complete markets model of capital
8See Aiyagari and Alvarez (1996) for an interesting example of an endowment economy where
lower bounds on the consumption possibilities set ensure that the economy is characterized by
an invariant distribution of wealth.
9See Cole and Kocherlakota (1997) for an economy with risky endowments and unobservable
storage, where the rate of return to storage is exogenous.
19accumulation. For instance, consider the cross-country evidence on savings, in-
vestment and consumption. Feldstein and Horioka (1980), Backus et al. (1992)
and Baxter and Crucini (1993), among others, have presented evidence that the
savings to investment correlation, within several economies, is positive. Backus
et al. and Baxter and Crucini (1994) have found that cross-country consumption
correlations are lower than the corresponding output correlations. Both empirical
regularities have been interpreted as inconsistent with frictionless international
borrowing and lending. However, in a two-country model with complete mar-
kets, productivity spill-overs and capital adjustment costs, Baxter and Crucini
(1993) have reproduced the positive savings-investment correlation. Their result
emphasizes country size. In our model, the presence of private information yields
positive correlation of savings and investment. We are able to generate this result
even though locations are small and productivity is independently distributed.
With respect to the consumption correlation anomaly, Baxter and Crucini (1994)
have developed explanations which rely, in part, upon exogenous restrictions on
…nancial arrangements. Our economy provides a basis for such departures from
the complete markets assumption.
Appendix
A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1:




































2 and this common value, labeled u
0 is independent of u and thus
common to all contracts.
2) ¸ > 0: (By contradiction) Given part (1), assume that ¸ = 0. Next, from (3.8)
and (3.9) we have °1 = °2 while (3.6) and (3.7) yield z1 +b1 = z2 +b2. Since this
implies that z2 + b1 > z2 + b2 we have violated (3.3).












4) b1 < b2: Given parts(1) - (3), we knowthat ¯ log°2¡¯ log°1 > 0 which requires
that (1 ¡ ¯)(log(z2 + b2) ¡ log(z2 + b1)) < 0 for (3.3) to hold with equality.

















z2+b2 > 0. This requires
that z1 + b1 < z2 + b2.







= µ and qµ = 1, (3.10) and (3.9) may be solved as °1 = µ¯ ¡
¸¯
¹1 and
°2 = µ¯ +
¸¯
¹2. Next (3.6) and (3.7) may be rearranged as
¹1(z1 + b1) + ¸(1 ¡ ¯)
z1 + b1
z2 + b1
= ¹1µ (1 ¡ ¯)
¹2(z2 + b2) ¡ ¸(1 ¡ ¯) = ¹2µ (1 ¡ ¯).
It then follows that
2 X
i=1






= µ ¡ ».






> 0. Recalling the equilibrium condition
P2
i=1¹i(bi + °i) =
0, we have proven µ < ». Therefore q» > 1 and
P2
i=1¹i°i = ¯µ < ¯».
B. Iso-elastic preferences
We solve the iso-elastic case, drawing heavily on the analysis of section 3. The
intensive form composite state variable, for this case, is given by u = U
k1¡¾. The
contract is determined by solving (3.5) subject to (B.1) - (B.3).



















































Suppressing (B.1) which, as before, does not bind, de…ning ¸ to be the multiplier








¹1 + ¸1(1 ¡ ¯)(z2 + b1)
¡¾ ¡ ¹1µ(1 ¡ ¯)(z1 + b1)
¡¾ = 0 (B.4)
¹2 ¡ ¸1(1 ¡ ¯)(z2 + b2)
¡¾ ¡ ¹2µ(1 ¡ ¯)(z2 + b2)















1 (1 ¡ ¾)u
0















2 (1 ¡ ¾)u
0


















2 = 0 (B.9)
It is straightforward to show that proposition 3.1 holds for the general iso-
elastic case. Furthermore, equilibrium in the economy with iso-elastic preferences
may be calculated using the method described in section 3.2. An examination of
the growth e¤ects of private information given iso-elastic utility, which requires
numerical methods, is contained in table 3 and discussed in section 4.
References
[1] Aiyagari, S. R. and F. Alvarez (1995), ”Stationary E¢cient Distributions
With Private Information and Monitoring: A Tale of Kings and Slaves ”
University of Chicago working paper
[2] Aiyagari, S. R. and S. D. Williamson (1997), ”Credit in a Random Matching
Model With Private Information” University of Iowa working paper #97-03.
[3] Atkeson, A. and R. E. Lucas (1992), ”On E¢cient Distribution with Private
Information” Review of Economic Studies 59, 427-53.
[4] Athanasoulis, S. and E. Van Wincoop (1997), ”Growth Uncertainty and Risk-
Sharing” Iowa State University working paper.
[5] Backus, D. K.., P. J.. Kehoe and F. E. Kydland (1992), ”International Real
Business Cycles,” Journal of Political Economy 100, 745-75.
23[6] Baxter, M. B. and M. J. Crucini (1993), ”Explaining Saving-Investment Cor-
relations,” American Economic Review 83, 416-36.
[7] Baxter, M. B. and M. J. Crucini (1995), ”Business Cycles and the Asset
Structure of Foreign Trade” International Economic Review v36, 821-54.
[8] Cochrane, J. H. (1991), ”A Simple Test of Consumption Insurance” Journal
of Political Economy 99, 957-76.
[9] Cole, H. L. and N. R. Kocherlakota (1997) ”A Microfoundation for Incom-
plete Security Markets” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research De-
partment Working Paper 577.
[10] Devereux, M. B. and G. W. Smith (1994), ”International Risk Sharing and
Economic Growth” International Economic Review 35, 535-50.
[11] Feldstein, M. and C. Y. Horioka (1980), ”Domestic Saving and International
Capital Flows” Economic Journal 90, 314-29.
[12] Green, E. J. (1987), ”Lending and the Smoothing of Uninsurable Income” in
Prescott and Wallace, editors, Minnesota Studies in Macroeconomics, Vol. I:
Contractual Arrangements for Intertemporal Trade, University of Minnesota.
[13] Hayashi, F., J. Altonji and L. Kotliko¤ (1996), ”Risk-Sharing Between and
Within Families” Econometrica 64, 261- 94.
[14] Heaton, J. and D. Lucas (1996), ”Evaluating the E¤ects of Incomplete Mar-
kets on Risk Sharing and Asset Pricing” Journal of Political Economy 104,
443-87.
24[15] Khan, A. and B. Ravikumar (1996), ”Enduring Relationships and Capital
Accumulation” University of Virginia working paper.
[16] Levhari, D. and T. N. Srinivasan (1969), ”Optimal Savings under Uncertain-
ty” The Review of Economic Studies 36, 153-63.
[17] Mace, B. J. (1991), ”Full Insurance in the Presenceof AggregateUncertainty”
Journal of Political Economy 99, 928-56.
[18] Maitra, P. (1997) ”Is Consumption Smooth at the Cost of Volatile Leisure?
An Investigation of Rural India” University of Southern California working
paper
[19] Marcet, A. and R. Marimon (1992), ”Communication, Commitment, and
Growth.” Journal of Economic Theory 58, 219-49.
[20] Mehra, R. and E. C. Prescott (1985), ”The Equity Premium Puzzle” Journal
of Monetary Economics 15, 145-61.
[21] Obstfeld, M. (1994). ”Risk-Taking, Global Diversi…cation, and Growth”
American Economic Review 84, 1310-29.
[22] Oh, S. and E. J. Green (1992), ”A re-examination of optimal contracts”
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research department working paper,
No. 490.
[23] Parente, S. L. and E. C. Prescott (1993), ”Changes in the Wealth of Nations”
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 17, 3-16.
25[24] Phelan, C. and R. M. Townsend (1991), ”Computing Multi-Period,
Information-Constrained Optima,” The Review of Economic Studies 58, 853-
82.
[25] Spear, S. E. and S. Srivastava (1987), ”On Moral Hazard with Repeated
Discounting” The Review of Economic Studies 54, 599-617.
[26] Thomas, J. and T. Worrall (1990), ”Income Fluctuations and Asymmetric
Information: An Example of a Repeated Principal-Agent Problem” Journal
of Economic Theory 51, 367-90.
[27] Townsend, R. M. (1994), ”Risk and Insurance in Village India,” Econometrica
62, 539-92.
[28] Taub, B. (1990) ”The Equivalence of Lending Equilibria and Signalling Based
Insurance under Asymmetric Information” The Rand Journal of Economics
21, 388-408.
[29] Weil, P. (1990), ”Nonexpected Utility in Macroeconomics” Quarterly Journal
of Economics 105, 29-42.
26Table 1: Baseline Parameters
Table 2: The contract
Table 3: Varying the elasticity of substitution
z1 1 z2 2 m m1 1 b b s s
0.9585 1.1715 0.5 0.9577 1.0
A I C
u -2.7712 -2.6687 -2.6522
Loss (%) 11.2000 1.6000 0.0000
b1 -0.9180 -0.9138 -0.9135
b2 -1.1220 -1.1248 -1.1265
c1 0.0405 0.0447 0.0450
c2 0.0495 0.0467 0.0450
g1 0.9180 0.9809 1.0200
g2 1.1220 1.0577 1.0200
E(g) 1.0200 1.0193 1.0200
DU 0.0148 0.0184 0.0198
s: s: 0.5 0.75 1 2 3 4
C 4.03 2.67 2.00 0.99 0.66 0.50
Growth (%) I 3.93 2.58 1.93 0.96 0.64 0.48
A 3.77 2.54 2.00 1.50 1.67 2.01
Loss (%) I 2.57 1.96 1.63 0.83 0.48 0.31
A 9.77 9.79 11.21 18.45 25.99 33.40Table 4: Varying the coefficient of variation
Table 5: Varying the discount factor
Coeff. var.: 0.05 0.10 0.20
C  2.00 2.00 2.00
Growth (%)   I 1.96 1.93 1.90
A 2.00 2.00 2.00
Loss (%) I 0.79 1.63 2.93
A 2.92 11.21 38.31
b: b: 0.9390 0.9577 0.9765
C  0.000 2.000 4.000
Growth (%) I -0.001 1.930 3.970
A 0.000 2.000 4.000
Loss (%) I 1.65 1.63 1.50



































































































 Figure 3: The distribution of utility entitlements 
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